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0Environmental Policy, the Porter Hypothesis and the Composi-
tion of Capital: Eﬀects of Learning and Technological Progress
Abstract
In this paper the eﬀect of environmental policy on the composition of capital is investigated.
By allowing for non-linearities it generalizes Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw (Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management, 1999) and determines scenarios in which their results do
not carry over. In particular, we show that the way acquisition cost of investment decreases
with the age of the capital stock is of crucial importance. Also it is obtained that environmental
policy has opposite eﬀects on the average age of the capital stock in the case of either deteri-
oration or depreciation. We also focus more explicitly on learning and technological progress.
Among others we obtain that in the presence of learning, implementing a stricter environmental
policy with the aim to reach a certain target of emissions reduction has a stronger negative
eﬀect on industry proﬁts, which implies quite the opposite as to what is described by the Porter
hypothesis.
Keywords: Porter hypothesis, dynamics of the ﬁrm, vintage capital stock, environmental
policy, technological progress
JEL-codes: C61, O33, Q28
11 Introduction
The Porter hypothesis says that environmental policy spurs innovation which makes ﬁrms better oﬀ
in the long run, since it increases their competitiveness (Porter [13], Porter and van der Linde [14]).
The main argument is that ﬁrms are not aware of certain opportunities and that environmental
policy might open the eyes. This results in a win-win situation in the sense that environmental
policy improves both environment and competitiveness. The hypothesis is criticized by economists
who argue that extra costs are not needed to trigger fruitful innovations and adopting modern
machines that are more proﬁtable. In rational economic modelling it cannot be explained why
ﬁrms do not see these opportunities by themselves, which at least implies that the argument does
not have a general validity.
The validity of the Porter hypothesis was investigated in a very interesting contribution by
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw [16] in the context of a dynamic model of the ﬁrm. In this model
ﬁrms can invest in machines of diﬀerent ages (see also Barucci and Gozzi [1], Hartl et al. [11],
and Feichtinger et al. [10]2) so that it could be investigated in what way environmental policy
modernizes the machine park. It was found that more stringent environmental policy reduces
capital stock (downsizing), and reduces the average age of the machines (modernization). Newer
machines are assumed to be more productive, so that the modernization eﬀect results in an increase
of average productivity. The conclusion concerning the validity of the Porter hypothesis is that a
win-win situation will not hold, but the decrease in competitiveness due to the extra environmental
costs is mitigated by the modernization eﬀect.
The economic reason for modernization was that modern machines, although being more ex-
pensive, are more productive and pollute less. This can be caused by natural deterioration due to
aging, or technological progress. In Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] only the eﬀect of aging was
taken into account. Although they say otherwise, we actually will show that their model does not
contain technological progress. This implies that the eﬀect of technological progress remains to be
investigated, which will be done in the present paper.
Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw obtained this result under linear speciﬁcations while ignoring de-
preciation. In this paper we generalize their framework by allowing for non-linear functional forms
and technological progress. It was found that the result of Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw is still valid
as long as acquisition costs of investment are concavely decreasing in age. However, in case this
function is convexly shaped average productivity of the capital stock can decrease when a stricter
environmental policy is imposed.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that environmental policy has opposite eﬀects on the average age
of the capital stock in the case of either deterioration or depreciation. In the case of depreciation,
but without deterioration, the average age of the capital stock increases when the emission tax is
raised, while with deterioration it is the other way round.
As already mentioned, in Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] productivity goes down and pollution
increases as machines get older. However, due to learning the opposite is also possible. We in-
vestigate how learning aﬀects the results obtained by Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16]. As a result
we found that in the presence of learning, under a stricter environmental policy downsizing is not
necessarily accompanied by modernization but could even be accompanied by a raise of the average
2These contributions (including the present paper) are diﬀerent from works like Solow et al. [15], Malcomson
[12], Benhabib and Rustichini [2], and Boucekkine et al. ([3], [4], [5], [6]) in the sense that also investments in older
machines are possible. Economic reasons for doing so are that older machines are cheaper, easier to implement, and
learning can make them more productive and less polluting.
2age of capital stock. The reason is that when the emission tax rate is increased, ﬁrms react by in-
creasing the production per unit of emissions. In the presence of natural deterioration (Xepapadeas
and De Zeeuw) the increased productivity is reached by modernization, while in the presence of
learning (our model) productivity per unit of emissions is increased by employing older machines.
But again it has to be remarked that the shape of the acquisition cost function is crucial: this time
the above results may not hold in case of a concave function.
Furthermore it was found that learning reduces the eﬀect of a stricter environmental policy on
emissions. This result leads to a serious policy warning that is especially valid for situations where
learning is prominently present. It holds that, in comparison with a situation where learning is
not present, an emission tax rate has to be set at a higher rate in order to reach a given emission
reduction target, and this leads to a larger negative eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] limit their analysis to the OSSP (Optimal Steady State Problem,
see Carlson et al. [7]) without actually verifying whether the optimal solution will reach this steady
state. We will show that it is in fact optimal for the ﬁrm to reach this steady state as soon as
possible, which strengthens the validity of their results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reformulates the model of Xepapadeas and De
Zeeuw [16] where we add depreciation and discounting. Here we show that the ﬁrm always converges
to the steady state. In Section 3 we study the eﬀects of nonlinearities, and of deterioration and
depreciation of capital on the emission tax response of the average age and productivity of the
machines. In Section 4 the implications of learning are investigated. Technological progress is
considered in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes. All proofs and technical considerations are
collected in the Appendix, where also the precise assumptions are formulated in mathematical
terms.
2The Model
Here we present a slightly extended version of the model of Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] in the
sense that discounting and depreciation are added. As in their paper, here it also holds that the
age of the machine is denoted by a ∈ [0,h], so that the maximum age of the machines is h. As
usual, calendar time is denoted by t.
Denote by v(a) the output produced by a machine of age a,w i t hv (a) ≤ 0. That is, an
older machine cannot produce more output than a newer one. This model feature is taken from
Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] who argue that this implies that new machines are more productive
because they embody superior technology. However, this argument seems to be incorrect. To see
this, note that v(a) is the same for diﬀerent t. Now consider two points of time: t1 and t2 so that
t2 >t 1. Then a machine constructed at time t2 has the same productivity at the same age as a
machine constructed at time t1, i.e. the second machine produces at t2 + a amount v(a), which is
also the amount that the ﬁrst machine produces at t1 + a. Hence there is no superior technology
embedded in the machine constructed at t2. The conclusion is that, since v is independent of
calendar time t, no technological progress is included. In order to include technological progress,
output should be modelled by v(t,a) with, at least, vt > 0 (see Hartl et al. [11] and Feichtinger
et al. [10]). We will explore this further in Section 5. In this and the next two sections we only
consider the case of time-invariant v.
In fact, v (a) ≤ 0 can still be a sensible assumption, because due to natural deterioration or
aging machines can get less productive as time passes (see also Feichtinger et al. [9]). However,
3the opposite, i.e. v  (a) > 0, is also possible since this reﬂects that due to learning machines get
more productive over the years (cf. Hartl et al. [11]). The eﬀects of environmental regulation in
the presence of learning will be analyzed in Section 4.
The stock of capital goods of age a at time t is denoted by K(t,a). Then total output produced





It is assumed that markets exist for machines of any age from 0 to h. This is a strong assumption
but it is somewhat relaxed later on by the introduction of adjustment costs which may contain
search costs. Let b(a) be the cost of buying a machine of age a,w i t hb (a) ≤ 0 (older machines
cannot be more expensive than newer machines) and b(h) = 0 (a machine at the maximum age is
not worth anything).
Let I(t,a) be the number of machines of age a bought (if I(t,a) > 0) or sold (if I(t,a) < 0) in
year t. The total cost or revenue to the ﬁrm from transactions in the machine market is deﬁned as
b(a)I(t,a)+1
2 [I(t,a)]
2, with the second term reﬂecting the adjustment costs in buying or selling
machines. These costs are, for example, adaptation costs or search costs. The quadratic form of
this cost term leads to a simple expression for optimal purchases. In addition to Xepapadeas and
De Zeeuw [16] it is further imposed that machines of age a depreciate with rate δ (a), which is the
same for every vintage.
Running the machine is costly, and the running costs of a machine of age a are denoted by
c(a),c   (a) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, s(a) are emissions of a machine of age a, s  (a) ≥ 0. As a result of natural
deterioration, older machines emit at least as much as newer machines (but, analogous to our
argument in connection with v (a), not as a “result of cleaner technologies being embodied in the
new machines” (Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16], p. 168). Here also learning eﬀects may be present
resulting in s  ≤ 0: over time ﬁrms learn how to use machines in a more environmental friendly
way. We will consider this in Section 4.
Per unit of emissions the ﬁrm has to pay an emission tax τ. Then the cost of running one





The ﬁrm chooses to buy or sell machines of diﬀerent ages in order to maximize proﬁts, with p
the price of output. That is, the ﬁrm chooses at each point in time an age distribution of machines






























= I(t,a) − δ (a)K(t,a), (2)
K (t,0) = I0 (t) ≥ 0,K (0,a)=K0 (a) ≥ 0. (3)
4K (t,a) ≥ 0, (4)
This is an inﬁnite horizon optimal control problem with transition dynamics described by a lin-
ear partial diﬀerential equation (Carlson, Haurie and Leizarowitz [7])3. The transition equation
indicates that the rate of change in the number of machines of a given age, a,a tag i v e nt i m e ,
t, is determined by two factors. These are the reduction or increase in the number of machines
brought about by the sale or acquisition of machines of given age a (the ﬁrst term of the transition
equation), and the reduction due to depreciation at rate δ (a). The investment I(t,a)i sc o n s i d e r e d
as a control variable. The initial condition on the number of machines implies that the ﬁrm starts
with given amount K0 (a) of machines of age a.A te a c ht i m et it is possible to buy new machines.
The purchase intensity of new machines is denoted by I0. Both K0(a)a n dI0(t) can also be consid-
ered as (initial and boundary) control variables, in which case the corresponding costs should be
added to the objective function (1). However, we do not expect this to bring new economic results.
Therefore, in what follows we consider K0(a)a n dI0(t) as given, and take for simplicity I0(t)=0 .
The current value Hamiltonian H for this problem is given by (see, e.g., Feichtinger and Hartl
[8]):





+λ(t,a)[I(t,a) − δ (a)K(t,a)]. (5)
Consequently, the ﬁrst-order optimality conditions are
∂H
∂I









=( r + δ (a))λ(t,a) − pv(a)+c(a)+τs(a), (7)
λ(t,h)=0 . (8)







a (r+δ(ρ))dρ [pv(α) − c(α) − τs(α)] dα. (9)






a (r+δ(ρ))dρ [pv(α) − c(α) − τs(α)] dα − b(a). (10)
An expression for the stock of capital goods can be derived from (2), assuming for the moment
that a ≤ t:
K(t,a)=









3About the precise meaning of optimality, see Remark 1 in Section 7.1























In case t<a ,i.e. the vintage already exists at the initial time, it is easily derived via the second
boundary condition in (3) that
K(t,a)=K0 (a − t)e
−
  a












σ (r+δ(ρ))dρ [pv(α) − c(α) − τs(α)] dα − b(σ)

dσ.
An implicit assumption for the subsequent analysis is that the values of K(t,a) obtained by
the above formulas are all nonnegative, so that the constraint (4) is automatically satisﬁed. We
elaborate on this in Section 7.1.
An important observation is that (9) and (10) are time invariant. Moreover, K (t,a) depends on
t only in case t<a .This means that after h years everything becomes time invariant, that is, the
steady state with respect to calendar time is reached. We thus can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 At least after h years the ﬁrm reaches its steady state. For each age a ∈ [0,h] the
capital stock is then time invariant and given by (12). The investment rate in a capital stock of a
given age is also constant over time and given by (10).
3 Eﬀects of Nonlinearities, Capital Deterioration and Deprecia-
tion on Modernization and Productivity
In this section we study whether introducing nonlinearities inﬂuences the impact of the emission
tax on the average age and productivity of the capital stock. Also, we investigate the eﬀects of the
deterioration rate and the depreciation rate.














Due to the fact that they completely focus on natural deterioration and that they assumed a simple
linear speciﬁcation for v (a), i.e.
v(a)=a0 + a1 (h − a), (15)
where a0 is nonnegative and a1 is strictly positive, Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] obtained a
monotonic relationship between modernization and productivity in the sense that the lower the
6average age of the machines the higher the productivity is. Then they prove for linear speciﬁcations
of c(a),b(a), and s(a) that an increase in the emission tax reduces the optimal average age of the
capital stock and increases its average productivity.
The following proposition extends this result to nonlinear functional forms.
Proposition 2 Consider the model set up for the scenario without depreciation and discounting,
thus r = δ (a)=0 ,w h e r ev (a) is not identically zero and non-increasing in a, c(a) and s(a) are
non-decreasing, and b(a) is concave. Then at any time t ≥ h it holds that an increase in the
emission tax rate
i) reduces or keeps the optimal average age of the capital stock at the same level. If either v (a)
is strictly decreasing, or one of c(a) and s(a) is strictly increasing, or b(a) is strictly concave, then
the optimal average age strictly decreases with the increase of the tax rate;
ii) raises or keeps the average productivity of the capital stock at the same level. If v (a) is
strictly decreasing then the average productivity strictly increases with the increase of the tax rate.
The shape of the acquisition cost b(a) turns out to be one of the essential determinants of the
optimal average age and the average productivity of the capital stock. To focus on its implications
for average age let us for the moment assume that all other functions are age independent, i.e.
v(a)=v,c(a)=c,s(a)=s.
Note that under this speciﬁcation average productivity is constant and equal to v. Then it can be
shown that for a linear speciﬁcation of b(a), e.g. b0 (a)=b.(h − a), which is the speciﬁcation that
Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw used to derive their result, it holds that average age is not inﬂuenced
by an increase of the emission tax rate4.
In case of a strictly concave speciﬁcation like, e.g.
b2 (a)=[ h − a][b + a],
an increase of the emission tax rate reduces average age, as described in Proposition 2.
Next, consider the strictly convex function
b1 (a)=[ h − a][b − a]
with b ≥ h. The consideration in Section 7.1 used in the proof of Proposition 2 shows that now an
increase of the tax rate leads to a higher average age. The conclusion is that the result obtained
under a linear speciﬁcation is not robust: an arbitrarily small nonlinear perturbation of the linear
case leads to qualitatively diﬀerent behavior. However, if the function b(a) is strictly concave or
4In fact one can prove that average age and average productivity are also not inﬂuenced by an increase of the
emission tax rate if b(a)s a t i s ﬁ e s   h
0
(h
2 − 5hσ +4 σ
2)b(σ)dσ =0 . (16)
The benchmark function b0(·)=b.(h − a) satisﬁes this equation. But it has also nonlinear solutions. Among the
polynomials of degree not bigger than 2, the only function satisfying (16) and b(h) = 0 (modulo a constant multiplier)
is b0(·). But there is a family of polynomials of order 3, which satisfy (16), b(h) = 0, and are non-increasing. All of
















133]. The particular choice c = −1g i v e sh(h − a).
7convex, then the corresponding qualitative behavior is robust with respect to all suﬃciently small
twice continuously diﬀerential perturbations of b(a).
The above is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the result of a numerical exercise based on
the following parameter values: h =1 0 ,b=1 0 ,v(a) = 200,c(a)=0 ,s(a) = 18, and τ ∈ [0,10].
[Figure 1 about here.]
Below we numerically investigate how the deterioration rate and the depreciation rate inﬂuence
the tax-response of the average age and productivity. Both deterioration and depreciation are
aimed to model the impact of aging on the machines, but they take into account diﬀerent aspects:
deterioration reﬂects the decrease of productivity of the machines, while depreciation reﬂects the
decrease in the number of machines due to break-down. This diﬀerence turns out to be signiﬁcant
in the context of emission tax eﬀects.
Consider the same example as above, but with the linear acquisition cost b(a)=b.(h − a), and
for three diﬀerent functions v(a), namely v(a) = 200, v(a) = 200e−0.05a,a n dv(a) = 200e−0.1a.
Figure 2 (left) shows that a higher deterioration rate leads to a lower average age of capital, and
to a faster decrease of the average age with τ. The reason is that in this model emissions depend
on capital stock and not on production. A higher deterioration rate causes lower productivity of
older machines while the emission tax stays the same. Capital stock is kept operational as long
as it is proﬁtable, i.e. as long as revenue exceeds the sum of running costs and emission taxes.
Revenue decreases faster under a higher deterioration rate so that only younger vintages are kept
when the deterioration rate is higher. This eﬀect is magniﬁed if the tax rate is higher since total
costs increase with the tax rate.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Now we ﬁx v(a) = 200 and let the depreciation rate δ take the three diﬀerent values δ =0 .2,0.4,
and 0.6. As before, the higher is the rate, the lower is the average age for zero tax. However, when
the tax increases the average age increases. The higher is the depreciation rate the faster is the
increase of the average age. This can be explained as follows. In contrast with the deterioration
rate which only reduces production and thus revenue, the depreciation rate both aﬀects revenue
as well as emission taxes negatively. This is because revenue and emission taxes depend on capital
stock, and the latter is reduced by depreciation. Under a higher emission tax rate a reduction in the
capital stock leads to a larger decrease of emission taxes, which makes it relatively more desirable
to produce with older capital goods. Consequently, if depreciation is signiﬁcant, this ”emission tax
eﬀect” raises the average age of the capital stock when the emission tax rate is increased. Moreover,
this eﬀect is larger for larger depreciation rates.
4 Eﬀects of Learning on Modernization and Productivity
Here we consider the consequences of the occurrence of learning. Learning can appear in two ways:
as machines get older it can increase productivity or reduce emissions. Concerning productivity
the presence of learning implies that for the function v (a) it holds that v  (a) > 0, which reﬂects
that due to learning machines get more productive over the years5. It is important to notice
5Here it holds that a new machine at time t, say machine 1, has productivity v (0). The same holds for a new
machine at time t + a,s a ym a c h i n e2 . In fact this is the same machine as the one bought a years ago with the only
8that modeling learning in this way implies that we implicitly assume perfect spillover of learning.
Consider two machines of age a at time t: machine 1 is purchased at time zero while machine 2 is
purchased at time t− . In our model both have the same value of v(a)s ot h a tl e a r n i n ga l s ot a k e s
place before a machine is purchased. Hence the economy as a whole builds up knowledge about
how to work with this machine eﬃciently, and this knowledge is exchanged freely among ﬁrms due
to e.g. labor mobility and schooling.
With emissions the presence of learning would result in s  (a) < 0, i.e. as machines get older it
is learned how to use the machine in a more environmental friendly way. Analogous to productivity
learning, also here perfect spillover is implicitly assumed.
First let us check whether this can possibly have an eﬀect on downsizing. To do so we have to
























which remains clearly negative without being inﬂuenced by changed signs of v  and s . Hence, also
under learning an increase in the emission tax reduces the number of machines of each age in the
capital stock, which implies that the ﬁrm’s total emissions are reduced too.
Now let us turn to the modernization eﬀect and the relation between modernization and pro-
ductivity. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 Consider the model set up for the scenario without depreciation and discounting,
thus r = δ (a)=0 . If v(a) is not identically zero and non-decreasing in a, c(a) and s(a) are
non-increasing and b(a) is convex, then at any time t ≥ h it holds that an increase in the emission
tax
i) raises or keeps the optimal average age of the capital stock at the same level. If either v (a) is
strictly increasing, or at least one of c(a) and s(a) is strictly decreasing, or b(a) is strictly convex,
then the optimal average age strictly increases with τ.
ii) raises or keeps the average productivity of the capital stock at the same level. If v (a) is
strictly increasing, then the average productivity strictly increases with τ.
The conclusion of Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] was that when downsizing is accompanied by
modernization a stricter environmental policy can increase the average productivity of the capital
stock. Our result shows that in the presence of learning this need not be true. In fact, under
learning a stricter environmental policy can also result in an increase of average productivity, but
now this increase is caused by the presence of older machines. Note that also here the shape of the
acquisition cost function b(a) is crucial: in case this function is strictly concave contrary eﬀects
arise and no general conclusions can be drawn with respect to the eﬀect of environmental policy
on optimal average age and average productivity of the capital stock.
diﬀerence that it is of age zero. But the model implies that at time t+a machine 1 will have productivity v (a)w h i c h
is greater than the productivity v (0) of machine 2. Hence, according to the model the ﬁrm should learn again to
work on the same machine, which does not make much sense.
It seems that the learning eﬀects like they are modelled here are only present when they are accompanied by
technological progress. Still, in this section we choose to model learning separately in order to single out the eﬀects
caused by learning. Moreover the results obtained here will also hold in scenarios where technological progress is slow
relative to the learning eﬀect.
9Proﬁt Eﬀects of Emission Taxes
To analyze the eﬀect of an emission tax on proﬁts, Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] depart from a
framework of an international duopoly. The ﬁrm in the home country is subject to an emission tax,
while the ﬁrm in the other country operates without being bothered by environmental regulation.
Following Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16] we consider a linear demand schedule and we let capital
stock be a function of age and the tax rate while leaving out time:







where we attach the superscript τ to the optimal capital stock to indicate its dependence on τ.I t
is easy to determine the equilibrium price, which has the form



































σ 2v (a)v (α)d αdσda
.
The aim is to determine the eﬀect of an emission tax on proﬁts and emissions. To do so, ﬁrst a





Then it can be derived that
p0 =




In what follows we assume that, in the absence of emission taxes, the equilibrium price is suﬃciently
large so that
p0y − c − b>0. (19)
The benchmark case is compared to a case where productivity varies with age. Xepapadeas and
















10Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw assume that κ ∈ [0,1), implying that productivity is decreasing in age.
In order to introduce productivity learning, implying that productivity increases with age, we just
need to assume that κ>1. Then the speciﬁcation under (20) is such that productivity learning is
present.
For p0 it turns out that the speciﬁcation under (20) leads to the same expression (18) as in the
benchmark case. Of course, also for κ>1 this expression for p0 holds.





















This result holds in case of productivity learning, i.e. κ>1, too.
Using this framework the following proposition can be stated for κ ∈ (1,κ ∗), where κ∗ > 1i s
speciﬁed in Section 7.3. In this proposition we directly compare the marginal decrease of proﬁt per
unit of marginal decrease of emissions, for the case of learning and for the benchmark case.
Proposition 4 Let dSb (τ)/dτ, dSv (τ)/dτ, and dΠb (τ)/dτ, dΠv (τ)/dτ denote the marginal de-
creases in emissions and proﬁts by a stricter environmental policy in the home country, in the
benchmark and productivity learning cases, respectively. Then under the assumptions made previ-













The results in Proposition 4 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16]. Their
Proposition 3 claims that  
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 , (22)
which in fact means that if productivity decreases due to aging, the reduction in emissions due
to stricter environmental policy is larger. If productivity learning is present the reverse is true.
This implies that if productivity increases due to learning the reduction in emissions due to stricter
environmental policy will be smaller. Thus the presence of productivity learning mitigates the
eﬀect of stricter environmental policy with respect to emissions reduction.
Now, we examine the eﬀect of an emission tax on proﬁt. For κ<1 Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw
obtained the result that  
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 .
This implies that in the case of varying productivity the eﬀect of a stricter environmental policy
on proﬁts is lower. However, in Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw only the case of productivity being
11decreasing in age was considered. In the case of increasing productivity due to learning we establish
that an emission tax that decreases emissions by one unit, leads to a larger decrease of proﬁt,
compared to the benchmark case where learning is not present.
The conclusion is that in the presence of productivity learning a stricter environmental policy
can have a more negative eﬀect on the economy: to obtain a given emissions reduction the emission
tax increase should be higher, and the resulting negative eﬀect on industry proﬁts is larger.
5 Eﬀects of Technological Progress on Modernization and Pro-
ductivity
To include technological progress we introduce the function f (t − a) (see also Feichtinger et al.[10],
and Hartl et al.[11]), where the output of a machine of age a in year t is now given by v(a)f (t − a).
We consider the case of process innovation rather than product innovation. This implies that more
goods are produced using a capital good of a younger age, but on the other hand that the quality
of the produced goods is constant over time. Due to technological progress the output produced
by a machine of some ﬁxed age a increases with the vintage t−a. More modern machines are more
productive because they embody superior technology. Therefore, it holds that f  (t − a) > 0.
Due to technological progress a machine will operate more eﬃciently. Therefore we include
the possibility that a machine build at a later date will produce less emissions. To formalize this
we impose that the emissions of a machine of age a in year t are given by fs (t − a)s(a), where
f 
s (t − a) ≤ 0. Similarly we assume that the running costs are fc (t − a)c(a)w i t hf 
c (t − a) ≤ 0. It
is important to notice that with this model extension Proposition 1 does not hold anymore. This is
because in (10) and (12) v (α) needs to be replaced by f (t − a)v(α), which implies that the time
invariancy is gone. Hence, the ﬁrm does not reach a steady state after h years. Economically, this
is easy to understand since the increased productivity over time makes it worthwhile for the ﬁrm
to keep on growing.
It is easy to see that the downsizing eﬀect of an emission tax arises also here, since also under
technological progress the number of machines decreases under a marginal emission tax increase.
To study the modernization eﬀect and the relation between modernization and productivity let us
specify a simple linear function for f (t − a):
f (t − a)=f0 + κ[t − a], (23)
with f0 and κ being nonnegative constants such that f0 >κ h . As is shown in Feichtinger et al.[10]
a speciﬁcation like this also covers “Moore’s law” which says that the memory and arithmetic
power of micro chips develop exponentially over time, if we assume in addition that production is
a logarithmic function of technology.
For the acquisition cost we impose a simple linear relationship:
b(a)=b[h − a]. (24)
Proposition 5 Consider the model set up for the scenario with technological progress, where
v  (a) ≤ 0. Assume that the functions fs and fc are non-increasing, s is non-decreasing and
δ(a)=r =0 .T h e n a t a n yt i m e t ≥ h it holds that an increase in the emissions tax reduces the
optimal average age of the capital stock and increases average productivity.
12In fact this is the main result of the Xepapadeas-De Zeeuw paper. We have thus shown that
this result carries over to a scenario with technological progress. However, there is one important
aspect which comes from the shape of the acquisition cost function. At the end of Section 2 we
already mentioned the crucial role of this shape with regard to the optimal average age of the
capital stock. That this also holds in the presence of technological progress can be illustrated if we
replace the speciﬁcation in (24) by
bγ (a)=[ b − γa][h − a],
with γ ∈ [0,1]. Note that for γ = 0 the two functions coincide. We carried out a numerical
investigation with speciﬁcations h = 10, b = 10, v(a) = 200, c(a)=0 ,s(a) = 18, τ = 10,
f (t − a)=1+0 .001[t − a], fs (t − a) = 1, for which the outcome is provided in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Again we see the crucial role of the shape of b(a): the intuitively plausible outcome of Propo-
sition 5, i.e. average productivity of the capital stock increases with the emission tax rate, does
no longer hold in case the acquisition function b(a) is suﬃciently convex. We see that for γ ≥ 0.5
average productivity starts to decrease (d(γ) < 0) when the emission tax rate increases.
6 Conclusions
This paper belongs to the literature in which the eﬀects of environmental regulation on ﬁrm be-
havior is examined. A speciﬁc feature of our framework is that productivity of the ﬁrm’s machines
ﬂuctuates over time. It can increase or decrease with age due to learning and technical deterioration,
respectively, and increases with every new vintage due to technological progress.
The contribution that comes most close to our work is Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [16]. They
consider the case of technical deterioration, i.e.productivity of machines decreases with age. For a
linear setting they obtain that stricter environmental regulation results in downsizing accompanied
by modernization. We found that their results are generalizable to nonlinear functional forms as
long as the acquisition costs of investments are concavely decreasing with age, and to the case
of technological progress. However, the latter case was only proved for a linear acquisition cost
function, and we provided a counterexample in which these acquisition costs were strictly convex.
In the presence of learning results are quite diﬀerent. Now, downsizing is accompanied by increasing
the average age of machines, but again this result only holds under speciﬁc requirements for the
investment acquisition costs. Moreover, where Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw derive that varying
productivity due to aging leads to a larger eﬀect of an increased emission tax rate on emission
output and a lower eﬀect on proﬁts, in our learning case we obtain a lower eﬀect on emission output.
It turns out that an emission tax increase that ensures a given emissions reduction, decreases the
proﬁts in the presence of learning more than in the benchmark case where learning does not occur.
Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw conclude that, in connection with stricter environmental policy,
“the trade-oﬀ between environmental conditions and proﬁts remains but is less sharp because of
downsizing and modernization of the industry”. We get from our work that this conclusion does not
carry over to the learning scenario: in that case the trade oﬀ is more likely to be sharper because
the emission tax increase should be larger to reach a given emissions output reduction, and the
eﬀect on the ﬁrm proﬁts is more severe. Hence the conclusion must be that the Porter hypothesis
is rejected strongly in the presence of learning eﬀects.
137 Technical Appendix
7.1 Auxiliary Analysis
We start with some preliminary analysis that will be used in the proofs of the propositions.
First we shall extend the formula (12) to the case of technological progress. To do so the
functions v(a), c(a)a n ds(a) in the objective function have to be replaced by f(t − a)v(a), fc(t −
a)c(a), and fs(t − a)s(a), respectively. As in the case without technological progress, we obtain


















provided that K(t,a) given by this formula is nonnegative.
Remark 1 Since we consider an inﬁnite horizon problem, the objective function can be inﬁnite,
especially in the case of technological progress or zero discount rate. The optimality should be
understood in the following sense (we use the terminology from Carlson, Haurie and Leizarowitz
[7]). If there is no technological progress optimality means “decision horizon optimality”, which
implies “strong optimality” in case r>0. If there is a technological progress the optimality has the
following meaning, rather usual for age-structured control problems: for every T ≥ 0t h e r ee x i s t s
T∗ ≥ T such that for every T  ≥ T∗ the optimal solution on the ﬁnite horizon [0,T ]c o i n c i d e sw i t h
Kτ (given by (25) on [0,T] (in our case T∗ = T + h).
Standing assumptions:
(i) f, fc,a n dfs are diﬀerentiable, strictly positive, and f/fc and f/fs are strictly monotone;
(ii) v, c,a n ds are not identically zero (except possibly c) monotone6, nonnegative, and continuously
diﬀerentiable;
(iii) b is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, nonnegative and monotone decreasing, b(h)=0 ;
K0(a) > 0 for every a ∈ (0,h);
(iv) K0(t,a) > 0 for all t and a ∈ [0,h].
The above assumptions imply that for a ﬁxed moment T there exists a τmax > 0 such that
Kτ(t,a) > 0 for every τ ∈ [0,τ max), t ∈ [0,T]a n da ∈ [0,h].
Clearly, for τ ∈ [0,τ max) the optimal capital stock is given by the formula (25). Moreover, the
denominator in the deﬁnition of Pϕ(τ) is positive.
In the remainder of this section we assume that δ(a)=r =0 .
Then for a ﬁxed t ≥ h the optimal capital stock can be written as (here we skip t in the notation,




   h
σ
[ ˆ f(a)v(α) − ˆ fc(a)c(α) − τ ˆ fs(a)s(α)]dα − b(σ)
 
dσ,
6everywhere in the paper the terms “monotone”, “increasing”, “decreasing” and “convex” are used in their non-
strict versions.
14where
ˆ f(a)=pf(t − a), ˆ fc(a)=fc(t − a), ˆ fs(a)=fs(t − a),






is related to the one corresponding to τ =0 .















We ﬁx an arbitrary τ ∈ (0,τ max). The inequality Pϕ(τ) ≺P ϕ(0) can be written as
R(ϕ, ˆ f,v) − R(ϕ, ˆ fc,c) − τR(ϕ, ˆ fs,s) − B(ϕ)
R(1, ˆ f,v) − R(1, ˆ fc,c) − τR(1, ˆ fs,s) − B(1)
≺
R(ϕ, ˆ f,v) − R(ϕ, ˆ fc,c) − B(ϕ)
R(1, ˆ f,v) − R(1, ˆ fc,c) − B(1)













Therefore it is enough to obtain conditions under which (27) holds. Then the same conditions have
to be posed for ˆ fc and c instead of ˆ fs and s.
Further we assume that v(0) and s(0) are strictly positive. If this is not the case for some of
them, say for v(0), then v(h) would be strictly positive since v(·) is monotone and not identically
zero. Then in the next integral representation one may use the value v(h) instead of v(0) and










v(0)R(ϕ, ˆ f,1) + V (ϕ) − B(ϕ)
v(0)R(1, ˆ f,1) + V (1) − B(1)
≺
s(0)R(ϕ, ˆ fs,1) + S(ϕ)






















ϕ(a) ˆ fs(a)s (β)(β)dβ dαdσ da,
15Since v(0), s(0) and R(1, ˆ f,1) are strictly positive, (28) is implied by the following three ones
(skipping further the last argument of R, which is always equal to one):
v(0)R(ϕ, ˆ f)+V (ϕ) − B(ϕ)











This implies the following suﬃcient condition for the relation Pϕ(s(·)) ≺P ϕ(0):
V (ϕ)R(1, ˆ f) ≺ V (1)R(ϕ, ˆ f)&B(1)R(ϕ, ˆ f) ≺ B(ϕ)R(1, ˆ f) (29)
& R(ϕ, ˆ f)R(1, ˆ fs) ≺ R(1, ˆ f)R(ϕ, ˆ fs)&S(1)R(ϕ, ˆ fs) ≺ S(ϕ)R(1, ˆ fs). (30)
The ﬁrst and the last relations are of the same type, but with reversed sign ≺. We separately
investigate the ﬁrst three relations.




















ϕ(a) ˆ f(a)dadσdα = G(ϕ;0).
Then






We now prove that ∆(β) does not change its sign in [0,h]. Assume the opposite. Clearly ∆(0) = 0
(since G(ϕ;0)G(1;0) − G(1;0)G(ϕ;0) = 0), and ∆(h)=0( s i n c eG(1;h)=G(ϕ;h)=0 ) . T h e n
∆ (·) must have at least two zeros in the open interval (0,h). We calculate






Since obviously ∆ (0) = 0, we conclude that ∆ (·) has at least three zeros in [0,h]. Then ∆   must
have at least two zeros in the open interval (0,h). We have that




Since obviously ∆  (h) = 0, we conclude as before that G   (·) must have at least two zeros in (0,h).
We have that
∆   (β)=ϕ(β) ˆ f(β)G(1;0) − ˆ f(β)G(ϕ;0).
Since ˆ f is strictly positive, the equation ϕ(β)G(1;0) = G(ϕ;0) must have at least two solutions in
(0,h). Since ϕ is a strictly monotone function, we arrive at a contradiction. This contradiction is
16caused by the assumption that ∆ changes its sign in [0,h]. Hence, ∆ has a constant sign. To ﬁnd
it we note that ∆(0) = ∆ (0) = 0, so that
sgn∆(β)=s g n∆   (0) ∀β ∈ [0,h],




ϕ(a) ˆ f(a)a(h − a/2)da.
Then from the expression for ∆  (β) we obtain that











ˆ f(σ)σ(h − σ/2)dσ
 
da.
Notice that the above expression depends linearly on ϕ, and equals zero if ϕ is constant. Then
the value does not change if we replace ϕ(a)w i t h
  a
0 ϕ (β)dβ. Changing once again the order of
integration we obtain that












Obviously Γ(0) = Γ(h)=0 . I fΓ ( β) changes its sign in [0,h], then Γ (β)m u s th a v ea tl e a s tt w o
zeros in (0,h). We have that
Γ (β)=− ˆ f(β)
  h
0
ˆ f(σ)[β(h − β/2) − σ(h − σ/2))]dσ.
Since p is strictly positive, the integral must vanish at least two times in (0,h). This, however,
cannot happen. Indeed, the integral is a quadratic function of β which takes the same negative
value   h
0
ˆ f(σ)σ(h − σ/2)dσ
for β =0a n dβ =2 h. Hence Γ (·) has at most one zero in [0,h]. Since Γ(0) = 0, we have
sgnΓ(β)=s g nΓ  (0), if the last value is nonzero. We already showed that Γ (0) is strictly positive.
Thus we obtain: if ϕ (β) ≺ 0o n[ 0 ,t], then ∆(β) ≺ 0. Now we conclude from (31) that:
if 0 ≺ v (β)a n dϕ (β) ≺ 0o n[ 0 ,t],
or v (β) ≺ 0a n d0≺ ϕ (β)o n[ 0 ,t],
then V (ϕ)R(1, ˆ f) ≺ S(1)R(ϕ, ˆ f) is fulﬁlled. (32)
Then by the same argument we also have:
if 0 ≺ s (β)a n d0≺ ϕ (β)o n[ 0 ,t],
or s (β) ≺ 0a n dϕ (β) ≺ 0o n[ 0 ,t],
then S(1)R(ϕ, ˆ fs) ≺ S(ϕ)R(1, ˆ fs) is fulﬁlled. (33)
17In both cases, the respective inequalities in (29)–(30) are strict, provided that the two inequal-
ities in the corresponding suﬃcient condition in (32) or (33)are strict for all β ∈ [0,h].












ˆ f(a)a(h−a/2)da ≺ 0.
Since the above expression is linear in ϕ and equals zero for a constant function ϕ, one can replace
ϕ(a)w i t h
  a













































[c1 ˆ f(β) − c2 ˆ fs(β)].
Since p/q is assumed strictly monotone, ∆ (β) has at most one zero in (0,h). Since obviously
∆(0) = ∆(h) = 0, we conclude that ∆(β) does not change its sign in [0,h]. Since ∆(0) = ∆ (0) = 0,
one needs to evaluate ∆  (0) to obtain the sign of ∆(β). We have























According to the standing assumptions ω(a)= ˆ f(a)/ ˆ fs(a) is a strictly monotone function. Moreover









ˆ fs(α)[ω(0) − ω(α)]dα.
Since all multipliers of the brackets are strictly positive in (0,h) and the expression within the
brackets has a deﬁnite sign in this interval, ∆  (0) has a deﬁnite sign as well, and it is determined
by the sign of ω(0) − ω(α).
Hence we can conclude that
if 0 ≺ ϕ (a)a n d0≺ ( ˆ f/ˆ fs) (a)o n[ 0 ,h],
or ϕ (a) ≺ 0a n d(ˆ f/ˆ fs) (a) ≺ 0o n[ 0 ,h],
then R(ϕ, ˆ f)R(1, ˆ fs) ≺ R(1, ˆ f)R(ϕ, ˆ fs) is fulﬁlled. (34)
3. Finally, consider the second relation in (29)–(30), which is









ϕ(a)b(σ)dσ da ≺ 0.
Since the above expression is linear in ϕ and equals zero for a constant ϕ, we can replace ϕ(a)b y   a

















(h − σ)b(σ)dσ, R(1, ˆ f)=
  h
0
ˆ f(σ)σ(h − σ/2)dσ.
Thus we obtained that:
if (36) holds (or, equivalently, if (35) holds),
then B(1)R(ϕ, ˆ f) ≺ B(ϕ)R(1, ˆ f) is fulﬁlled. (37)
Combining the above considerations we obtain the following auxiliary conclusion.
Lemma 1 If ϕ, v, s, f, fs and b satisfy all conditions listed in (32), (37), (34), (33), and if c and
fc satisfy all those conditions that are required for s and fs,t h e nPϕ(τ) ≺P ϕ(0).
7.2Modernization and Productivity
7.2.1 The case without technological progress
We apply the results from the previous section with f(t − a)=fc(t − a)=fs(t − a)=1 .
Proof of propositions 2 and 3. We apply Lemma 1 with ϕ(a)=a for the average age, and
with ϕ(a)=v(a) for the average productivity. One only needs to elaborate the inequality (36) in











where R(1,1) = h3/3. Obviously ∆(h) = 0, and taking into account the deﬁnition of B(1) we get
that also b(0) = 0. If ∆(β) changes its sign in [0,h]t h e n∆  (β) must have at least two zeros in
(0,h). But since




which has one more zero at β = 0, we conclude that ∆  (β) must have at least two zeros in (0,h).
But
∆  (β)=B(1)(h − β) − R(1,1)b(β),
which has an additional zero at β = h. Hence, also ∆   (β) must have two zeros in (0,t). This
means that the equation
B(1) + R(1,1)b (β)=0
has at least two zeros. Since the function b (·) is assumed monotone, this is possible only if it is a
constant, which means that b(a)=b (0)(b − h). One can directly check that in this case ∆(β)i s
identically zero, therefore it does not change its sign as well.
Knowing that ∆(β) does not change its sign, and also that ∆(0) = ∆ (0) we obtain that
sgn∆(β)=s g n∆  (0),
provided that ∆ (0)  =0 .W eh a v et h a t






where obviously δ(0) = δ(h)=0 .T h e n




We see that if δ(σ) has a constant sign, then ∆(β) has the opposite sign. It remains to notice that
δ(σ) is positive for a concave function b(·) and negative for a convex one. We conclude that
if 0 ≺ ϕ (a)a n db  (a) ≺ 0o n[ 0 ,h],
or ϕ (a) ≺ 0a n d0≺ b  (a)o n[ 0 ,h],
then B(1, ˆ f)R(ϕ,1) ≺ B(ϕ)R(1,1) is fulﬁlled. (38)
Then Lemma 1 implies propositions 2 and 3. Q.E.D.
7.2.2 The case with technological progress
Proof of Proposition 5. We apply Lemma 1 with
ˆ f(a)=f0(t − a)=f0 + κ.(t − a),b (a)=b.(h − a),
As before, we only need to elaborate condition (36), which can be written as
  h
0









One can calculate that ∆(β)=−bκh3
48β2(h − β)(5h − 2β), which is negative in (0,h). Then the
proposition follows from Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
7.3 Proﬁt Eﬀects
Proof of Proposition 4. The validity of the considerations below is established for values of the
parameter κ in some interval κ∗ < 1 <κ ∗ and values τ ∈ (0,τ∗], τ∗ > 0. For such values of κ and
τ the capital stock at the optimal solution is supposed positive, so that the formulas from Section
2 are valid. The value κ∗ > 1 will be a subject to some more constraints speciﬁed below.






















and to suppose that κ∗ is chosen in such a way that di(κ) > 0f o rκ ∈ [1,κ ∗], which is always
possible.



































5(1 − κ2) < 4(1 − κ)2,
−9κ2 +8 κ +1< 0,
and the last inequality is true for κ>1. This proves the ﬁrst claim of the proposition.
Next we investigate the eﬀect of emission tax on proﬁts. For the benchmark case Xepapadeas














(p0y − c − d)
 
while for the case of varying productivity they derived that
dΠv(τ)
dτ



























Rearranging the terms one obtains that




d1(κ)(p0y − c − d) −
1
45






21Then (19) implies that ˜ π<0i fκ∗ > 1 is chosen suﬃciently close to one.












d1(κ)(p0y − c − d) − 1























dSb |τ=0 +( κ − 1)r(κ).
Obviously the remainder r(κ) is positive if κ∗ > 1 is chosen suﬃciently close to one. Hence, for
κ ∈ (1,κ ∗] we obtain the last claim of the proposition.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: The functions b0, b1 and b2 (left) and the corresponding average age of capital, if s =1 8
with τ ∈ [0,10] (right).
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Figure 2: Average age for diﬀerent deterioration rates (left) and diﬀerent depreciation rates (right).
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Figure 3: Representatives of the family of functions bγ(a) for diﬀerent values of γ (left); the
diﬀerence, d(γ), in the average productivity for τ =1 0a n dτ = 0, as a function of γ (right).
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